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ABSTRACT
Given AI’s growing role in modeling and improving decision-making,
how and when to present users with feedback is an urgent topic
to address. We empirically examined the eect of feedback from
false AI on moral decision-making about donor kidney allocation.
We found some evidence that judgments about whether a patient
should receive a kidney can be inuenced by feedback about partici-
pants’ own decision-making perceived to be given by AI, even if the
feedback is entirely random. We also discovered dierent eects
between assessments presented as being from human experts and
assessments presented as being from AI.
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1 INTRODUCTION
As AI becomes more prevalent as a tool to evaluate past choices and
improve future decision-making, how and when to present users
with feedback will become an increasingly urgent topic to address.
Determining user susceptibility to inaccurate feedback from AI will
also be crucial to prevent baseless—or malevolent—intervention in
decision-making assistance. In this work we aim to elucidate how
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people respond to feedback given by AI about their own decision-
making, to identify opinions about the credibility of AI feedback,
and to measure susceptibility to unfounded AI assessments.
We investigate how the perception of an AI-generated assessment
impacts moral decision-making. Specically, we consider the eect
of AI assessments: people’s responses to predictions about what
they will do, from assessments of the kind of person they are [12].
From a modeling perspective, this distinction is not as pronounced—
agents are dened by their actions and desires. However, previous
research has shown that people’s motivation for future action is
oen shaped by their perception of who they are [11].
us, as a starting point for a psychological investigation, we
focus on the eect an output has when interpreted as an assessment
of one’s moral values. In addition to our primary endeavor, we
consider two sub-questions: Do people respond more to assess-
ments that they believe to have come from AI than to those that
they believe to have come from a human? What is the eect of this
perception if they are immediately asked to report if they agree or
disagree with the assessment?
To address these questions, we conducted three studies on the
eect of what we call an articial articial intelligence (AAI) assess-
ment, in which random statements about users’ values were (falsely)
presented as AI-generated feedback. In each study, participants
received an AAI assessment of their morality before they were pre-
sented with a series of moral dilemmas involving kidney allocation.
We found that AAI assessments had an eect on participants’ allo-
cation choices between patients. Under some conditions, this eect
was slightly altered if participants were rst asked whether they
agreed with the assessment. We also found dierences between the
eect on people who believed the assessment to be AI-generated,
compared to those who believed that it was from human experts.
As our studies build on research across several disciplines includ-
ing computer science, moral psychology, and social psychology,
part of our eort is to suggest how relevant concepts can be rea-
sonably translated across these frameworks. From the perspective
of computer science, our question about AI assessment and moral
decision-making can be interpreted as determining the eect of
intervening on preferences by introducing a prediction, which is
presented to the user as an assessment in the sense described above.
e question of how most eectively to learn preferences is the
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focus of preference elicitation, a eld with broad applications in
several elds including medicine [17], marketing [9], and auction
design [5]. Preference elicitation is also a primary concern in social
choice [2]—the study of how to aggregate preferences for collective
decision-making; social choice has received signicant aention
from computer scientists [4], raising further questions about au-
tomation and AI in human decision-making.
However, to our knowledge, the eect of the perception of these
predictions has not been covered in the computer science or pref-
erence elicitation literature. To study this, our ‘articial AI’ (AAI)
goes one step further: aer making an assessment of a user, it
presents this assessment directly to the user. Does this impact the
user’s moral decision making, interpreted as an expressed prefer-
ence? is is an area in which research from psychology could be
informative.
When people receive assessments of themselves, even when the
assessments have no basis in reality, their behaviors may still be in-
uenced. For instance, behavior sometimes changes in response to
and accordance with false feedback: random feedback about results
of a political implicit associations test can impact level of political
engagement [16], and the Barnum (or Forer) eect, wherein people
accept vague assessments of their personality as true regardless
of accuracy, is well documented [7]. Furthermore, people can be
prompted to revise their political opinions when presented with
an inaccurate summary of relevant decisions that they just made
[8]. e eect of false reporting of individuals’ own beliefs is espe-
cially enduring if they provide an explanation for the position they
were informed they took initially, despite that being the opposite of
their original position [14]. e present research addresses whether
people’s beliefs about their own opinions is susceptible to false
inuence from AI.
2 METHODOLOGY
We designed a custom online platform to study the eect of AAI
assessment on decision-making. Each decision took the form of a
pairwise comparison [3]—a decision format used widely in many
disciplines, where an agent selects their most-preferred item from
two options. Using a participant’s answers to these comparisons,
we learned their decision function to describe their choices. In what
follows, we briey explain our methodology by describing the basic
scenario we presented to participants, the decision function used
for analysis, and the custom data-gathering platform that simulates
the decision making environment.
Scenario: Moral Decisions on Kidney Allocation. In order to elicit
preferences eciently—a decision function—from our participants,
we designed a simplied choice scenario with a small class of easily-
measurable preferences, situated within a hypothetical environ-
ment resembling a real life-and-death decision made every day:
allocating donor kidneys. Many of the features that the general
population considers important in determining kidney allocation
go beyond objective medical facts and enter into ethical opinions.
In the US, these decisions are guided strictly by UNOS policy1.
However, the general population may think other features to be
relevant to these decisions. For example, people are oen unwilling
to allocate organs to patients with features that do not contribute
1hps://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/media/1200/optn policies.pdf
to organ failure or prognosis [15]. is makes kidney allocation a
valuable avenue for comparing aitudes toward dierent ethically
relevant characteristics, and for studying dierences between in-
formal aitudes and lay opinions about what should be included in
formal policies.
We selected life expectancy (henceforth, “LifeExp”) and num-
ber of dependents (henceforth, “Dep”) as the basis for comparison
between patients in need of a kidney, because both have been
demonstrated to be of importance to the general population for
ethically relevant reasons [6] that can be manipulated indepen-
dently of one another (i.e. the patient’s life expectancy implies
nothing about their number of dependents and vice-versa). We
also included patient age, which is 40 years for all patients. In
these studies we presented each participant with several pairwise
comparisons, where the alternatives are two patients in need of
a single kidney; this is akin to the problem of allocating a single
deceased-donor kidney to one of two patients. In each study, these
features were explained to participants as follows:
Life Expectancy How many years the patient is expected
to live if they receive the kidney transplant, if the patient
makes no lifestyle changes.
Dependents e number of children under the age of 18
for whom the patient is responsible for providing at least
half the necessary support, including food, shelter, and
clothing.
Age e current age of the patient. All patients in the sce-
narios are 40 years old. is feature does not vary.
Because LifeExp and Dep impose dierent types of value on a
transplantable kidney, those two features may be varied indepen-
dently without either implying anything about the other. We held
age constant at 40 years to limit further the assumptions partici-
pants could make about the patients from the target features.
Measuring Participant Decision Functions: Feature Dominance.
Each participant may have arbitrarily complicated preferences in
this seing. One participant may only allocate kidneys to patients
with LifeExp greater than 10 years, and choose randomly otherwise.
Another participant might only care about a dierent feature (such
as the patient’s age) and completely ignore both LifeExp and Dep.
To avoid this problem we constructed a set of pairwise comparisons
that essentially ask which feature the participant cares most about.
In each comparison, one patient always had greater LifeExp and
less Dep than the other patient.
We assume that participants answer each comparison by select-
ing the patient with either greater LifeExp or Dep. Formally, we
assume that each participant has a simple decision model: with
probability p they prefer the patient with greater life expectancy,
and with probability 1 − p they prefer the patient with more de-
pendents. For ease of exposition, we express these probabilities as
percentages, where
%Life ≡ 100 × p
Because participants only considered a patient who was always
strictly greater in life expectancy and fewer in dependents to an-
other, this is simply the percentage of comparisons where the partici-
pant selects the patient with greater LifeExp :
%Life ≡ 100 × # of LifeExp Favoring Decisions# of Total Decisions
To measure the impact of an AAI assessment on participant de-
cision functions, we rst learned %Life for each participant. We
then compared the eect AAI assessments had on each interven-
tion group by aggregating the participants’ %Life from respective
groups.
Custom Online Platform for Data Collection. In a style similar to
e Moral Machine Project,2 we created a custom online platform
to facilitate data collection, called Who Gets the Kidney?3 e core
component of the online platform is the sequential display of a set
of a hypothetical decision-making scenarios in which participants
choose one of two patients to receive a donor kidney. In each study,
every participant received the same set of scenarios, but the display
of each scenario was randomized: each scenario appeared in a
dierent order for each participant, and each hypothetical recipient
in a scenario was randomly selected to be presented on either the
le or the right side. Participants were given a chance to review
their answer, and the option to change their minds as needed.
For each study below, participants were rst given a brief de-
scription of the decision-making scenario (kidney allocation). ey
were informed that if one patient received the kidney, the other
would not receive one, and that if a patient did not receive the
kidney they were expected to live less than a year. Furthermore, it
was made explicit that all transplants were likely to be successful.
From pilot testing, we expected that participants recruited online
would maintain aention on the kidney allocation task for between
20 and 30 patient prole pairs. As such, all studies asked participants
to respond to 20 pairs to ensure their focus. Further, pilot testing
suggested that decision-making time decreased substantially aer
the rst three pairs, indicating that participants took about three
decisions to get a grasp on the task. erefore, all studies used at
least 10 pairs to ensure that most of the participants’ decisions were
made with complete familiarity with the task.
3 STUDY 1
3.1 Method
114 participants were recruited on Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk)
in a single cohort (on a Monday aernoon). Only United States
residents were used. Aer data collection was completed, 17 partic-
ipants were excluded from analyses for failing an aention check
which required them to report the assessment they received. 6 at-
tempts were removed due to participants with the same IP address
making multiple aempts. is leaves a nal sample of N = 91 (41%
females and 59% males; mean age = 37.7, SD = 11.2, 76% white).
Participants were presented with background information on
kidney allocation and about the patient features in this survey. On
our online platform, participants were asked to make decisions on
a set of 10 scenarios. To limit decision complexity, we further sim-
plied the scenarios by keeping all but one patient feature the same
for each comparison. One patient always had a life expectancy
of 20 years and 0 dependents, while the other patient had 4 de-
pendents. e only variable feature was the life expectancy of the
2hp://moralmachine.mit.edu
3hps://whogetsthekidney.com
Figure 1: Study 1: medians and rst/third quartiles for %Life,
before and aer assessment for each participant
laer patient, ranging from 1 to 19 years. Aer these 10 decisions,
an “assessment” screen was displayed with the intervention text.
Participants were randomly assigned to view one of the following
AAI assessments:
LifeFavor “According to our AI model, you care a lot about
the life expectancy of the patients when making decisions
about who will get a kidney.”
DepFavor “According to our AI model, you care a lot about
how many dependents patients have when making deci-
sions about who will get a kidney.”
Immediately aerwards, participants were prompted to make 10
more decisions. While the comparisons were the same as the initial
10, participants were not explicitly informed of this. Furthermore,
the sequence in which the queries were shown was shued, and the
sides on which patient proles in each comparison were displayed
were randomly switched. Aer completing all kidney patient allo-
cation choices, participants responded to a survey, which included
demographic information and a question on whether they agreed
with the AAI’s assessment. ey were then debriefed, which in-
cluded telling them that the feedback was actually random.
3.2 Results
Aer exclusions, 32 participants received the LifeExp intervention
and 59 received the DepFavor intervention. %Life was created as
a summary variable to capture the proportion of life expectancy-
favoring decisions for each participant. Figure 1 displays the visu-
alization of the result.
As the Shapiro-Wilk test showed that normality did not hold for
%Life (p < 0.01), we used the non-parametric Wilcoxon rank sum
test to determine if the %Life for participants in each group moved
toward their respective assessment aer it was given. Specically,
we tested if, for LifeExp group, if the median %Life for the identical
set of comparison was higher aer assessment than before it. No
evidence suggested that this was the case (p = 0.30). e same was
true for participants who received the DepFavor assessment: no
evidence suggested that the median %Life were lower, i.e., more
dependents favoring, aer they were told that they cared more
about the number dependents (p = 0.54).
3.3 Discussion
Strikingly, both pre-assessment and post-assessment groups are
nearly identical. Two important observations came from this ex-
ploratory study. First, in the process of generating the initial 10
decisions as the input for the “AI,” participants may have formed ex-
plicit decision rules that made them resistant to intervention. is
would have been simple to do, since one patient always had 20 years
of life expectancy with no dependents in every comparison. Second,
the lack of the eect of DepFavor compared to LifeFavor could be
aributed to the fact to that Dep was invariant across patients,
while one patient’s LifeExp varied between comparisons.
4 STUDY 2
In this study we modied the design of Study 1 to amplify potential
eects of the intervention. First, we changed the position of the
intervention relative to the allocation decisions. Choice tendencies
that are constructed through repetition are more resistant to change
than choice tendencies developed through contextual cues [1]. Pre-
senting self-referential information before a task tends to cause
behaviors consistent with that self-referential information [10]. To
avoid pre-assessment heuristic development, and to promote the
AAI assessment as salient self-relevant information, we presented
the AAI intervention before the kidney allocation task. We asked
participants to complete a task on which the AAI’s assessment
could plausibly be based.
Second, we added two conditions in which we asked participants
if they agreed with their assessment before and aer the allocation
task. In Study 1, participants could develop an opinion about their
assessment while engaged in the allocation task, and report their
end agreement or disagreement based on their experience. We
predicted that judging the accuracy of the assessment before the
task would amplify either incorporation of the assessment into
participants’ self-referential beliefs (if they agreed), or reactions in
opposition to the assessment (if they disagreed).
4.1 Method
350 participants were recruited on MTurk in two cohorts (one
around midday on a Monday, one during aernoon on a Wednes-
day), although they were randomly assigned among all groups
within each cohort. As in Study 1, only US residents were used. 7
participants could not accurately report assessment received, and
11 failed an aention check implemented to exclude participants
who did not engage with the task (at the risk of also eliminating
participants who deliberately chose to allocate at random) by allo-
cating a kidney to a less desirable patient based on both features (0
dependents, 1 year life expectancy, versus 0 dependents, 20 years
life expectancy). 11 participants failed to nish the task. 6 aempted
the experiments twice. Some participants belonged to more than
one of the categories above. e nal sample aer exclusions was
therefore N = 322 (41% female and 58% males; mean age = 35.8, SD
= 10.2, 79% white).
As in Study 1, participants rst received background information
about the task and patient features. ey were also told that they
would answer a series of questions that an AI agent would use to
make an assessment about what they found most important in the
kidney allocation task.
Participants rated, on a 5-point Likert-type scale, the extent to
which they agreed or disagreed with 14 statements about the impor-
tance of using example features to determine who should receive a
kidney (e.g., “I feel that race is important in determining which patient
should receive a kidney” ). ese example features did not include life
expectancy, number of dependents, or age. Aerwards, participants
were randomly assigned to one of ve conditions, in which all but
control received AAI assessments that used contrastive language
(e.g., “you care more about the life expectancy of the patients than
how many dependents they have” ):
• Control: no assessment (n = 65)
• LifeFavor : participants “assessed” by AAI to prioritize
life expectancy over number of dependents (n = 66)
• LifeFavorQ : participants “assessed” by AAI to prioritize
life expectancy over number of dependents, and asked
immediately upon viewing the assessment if they agreed
with it (n = 60)
• DepFavor : participants “assessed” by AAI to prioritize
number of dependents over life expectancy (n = 64)
• DepFavorQ : participants “assessed” by AAI to prioritize
number of dependents over life expectancy, and asked
immediately upon viewing the assessment if they agreed
with it (n = 67)
Following intervention, all participants responded to twenty
curated patient comparisons in random order. As before, each
comparison had one patient with greater Dep and one with greater
LifeExp; unlike Study 1, both LifeExp and Dep varied by patient
and pair. Participants then completed the same post-task survey as
in Study 1, and were debriefed as in Study 1.
4.2 Results
As described in Methodology, we found %Life for each participant
by calculating the percentage of comparisons in which they decided
to allocate the kidney to the patient with higher life expectancy.
Figure 2 shows a box plot of %Life for each group, aggregated over
all comparisons.
Intervention groups LifeFavor (M=56, SD=10) and LifeFavorQ
(M=56, SD=10) both had greater mean %Life than Control (M=45,
SD=13). Also consistent with our main hypothesis, DepFavor (M=40,
SD=10) had lower mean %Life than Control. ese results are sug-
gestive of the hypothesis that an AAI assessment inuences people
to make decisions aligned with the assessment. e exception,
however, is that DepFavorQ (M=49,SD=13) had a higher %Life than
Control.
Our outcome measure, %Life, once again violated the normality
assumption (Shapiro-Wilk test: p < 0.01). As a result, we used
the non-parametric Wilcoxon rank sum test for one-sided compar-
ison between intervention groups and the control. Compared to
the control group, we have some reasonable evidence suggesting
that the median %Life was higher for LifeFavor (p = 0.056) and
Figure 2: Study 2: medians and rst/third quartiles for %Life
of participants in each group
LifeFavorQ (p = 0.057). However, we saw no evidence suggest-
ing that the median %Life are lower for DepFavor (p = 0.307) and
DepFavorQ (p = 0.85) than for Control.
4.3 Discussion
Overall, we may reasonably suggest that the modication of ex-
perimental conditions from Study 1 to Study 2 enhanced the eect
of AAI assessments, as evidenced by the moderate directional re-
sults. In Study 1, the LifeExp assessment had virtually no impact
on decision-making, but, in Study 2, participants in groups that
received a LifeFavor and LifeFavorQ assessment favored patients
somewhat more heavily on the basis of LifeExp than control. is
could be due to participants receiving their assessments before hav-
ing the chance to develop decision preferences, but also could be
due to the increased complexity of the comparisons. e result is
not overwhelming, however: in comparison, there seems to be no
evidence that DepFavor assessment had an impact on participants’
decision-making. Even more curious is the high p-value(0.85) from
the comparison between DepFavorQ %Life and Control %Life.
An exploratory analysis on the eect of participants’ agree-
ment or disagreement with their AAI assessment prior to deci-
sion making could provide some insight: we partitioned the Q
groups into 4 categories by assessment (LifeFavor/DepFavor) and
response (Agree/Disagree). Aer calculating their respective Life%,
the DepDisagree group had the highest %Life (M=81, SD=25, n=21),
followed by ExpAgree (M=69, SD=30, N=49), then DepAgree(M=34;
SD=30, n=46), and lastly ExpDisagree (M=19, SD=23, n=18). In
other words, those who disagreed with their assessment seemed
to make decisions contrary to their AAI assessment. However,
we urge caution against drawing strong conclusions from these
exploratory results.
5 STUDY 3
Study 3 compared the inuence of AAI assessments to that of
supposedly human assessments: we examined the eect of AAI
assessments relative to assessments believed to be generated by
human experts.
5.1 Method
450 participants were recruited on MTurk in two cohorts (one
between a ursday evening and a Friday around midday, and
one around midday on a Saturday), although they were randomly
assigned among all groups within each cohort. As in Studies 1 and
2, only US residents were used. Exclusion procedures were similar
to procedures in Study 2, except here we also checked if they could
report the source of the assessment. 59 participants were excluded
because they could not accurately report the assessment received
or its source, 22 were excluded because of failed aention checks
or failure to complete the task. e nal sample aer exclusions
was therefore N = 369 (43% female, 56% male, and 1% other/not
indicated; mean age = 38, SD = 11.3, 73% white).
Methods and assessments were similar to in Study 2. Participants
were randomly assigned to ve groups:
• Control: no assessment (n = 77)
• LifeFavorAI: participants were given an AAI assessment
stating that they care more about life expectancy than
number of dependents (n = 80)
• DepFavorAI: participants were given an AAI assessment
stating that they care more about number of dependents
than life expectancy (n = 75)
• LifeFavorPsy: participants were informed that, based on
a test made by “expert psychologists,” they care more about
life expectancy than number of dependents (n = 74)
• DepFavorPsy: participants were informed that, based on
a test made by “expert psychologists,” they care more about
the number of dependents than life expectancy (n = 63)
Aer the assessment, participants were told that their responses
to comparisons would be used either to train an AI that models
their decision-making, or by expert psychologists to develop a
psychological test. e post-task survey was similar to the post-task
survey used in Studies 1 and 2, as was the debrieng information.
5.2 Results
As in Study 2, we calculated %Life for each participant over all
comparisons. Both groups that received LifeExp assessments—
LifeFavorAI (M=45,SD=11) and LifeFavorPsy (M=60, SD=11)—had
higher %Life than Control (M=40,SD=12). Inconsistent with Study
2, however, was that the %Life were also higher for the groups
that received dependent-favoring assessments—DepFavorAI (M=42,
SD=11) and DepFavorPsy (M=42, SD=11). Figure 3 shows a boxplot
of %Life for subjects in each group.
Once again normality did not hold for %Life (Shapiro-Wilk test:
p < 0.01). First, we started with two-sided tests to determine
whether assessments from AAI had a dierence in eect from
assessments perceived to be from human experts. We found sta-
tistically signicant evidence for the hypothesis that the median
for LifeFavorAI was not equal to LifeFavorPsy (p = 0.01), but
there was no evidence of eect between DepFavorAI and DepFa-
vorPsy (p = 0.93).
Next, we used the one-sided Wilcoxon rank sum test for compar-
ison between intervention groups and the control. Consistent with
Figure 3: Study 3: medians and rst/third quartiles for %Life
for over all comparisons
the summary statistics, compared to Control LifeFavorPsy had a
statistically signicant higher %Life than Control (p < 0.001). Next,
the hypothesis that %Life for LifeFavorAI was greater than Control
with a low but statistically insignicant p-value (0.15). We found
no statistical evidence in support of the hypothesis that subjects
in DepFavorPsy (p = 0.75) and DepFavorAI (p = 0.67) allocated on
the basis of dependents more, i.e., having lower %Life, than control.
5.3 Discussion
We found strong evidence that, for the more impactful of our two
patient features (LifeExp), there was a dierence between the per-
ception of “AI” and “expert human” assessments.
Although life expectancy-favoring AAI assessments inuenced
participants to make allocation decisions in the expected direction
(as they did in Study 2) compared to control, participants responded
more strongly to the “expert” life expectancy-favoring assessment
by this metric than to any other condition. Furthermore, the results
of the LifeFavorAI and LifeFavorPsy groups were signicantly dif-
ferent from each other. is suggests that, for the more impactful
of our two patient features, there was a dierence between the
perception of “AI” and “expert human” assessments.
Dependent-favoring assessments did not notably impact decision-
making, although there was a very mild tendency for participants
in the dependent-favoring assessment groups to make allocation
decisions on the basis of life expectancy more frequently than con-
trol, which opposes our initial expectations. is could be related
to the control participants in Study 3 making allocation decisions
on the basis of dependents somewhat more frequently than did
control participants in Study 2 (perhaps due to the hours or days
at which data for Study 2 and Study 3 were collected). However,
as the results were not strong in either direction in the dependent-
favoring assessments, it is dicult to draw any rm conclusions
about this intervention’s eect.
6 GENERAL DISCUSSION
Overall, we derive three central ndings from these studies: First,
life expectancy-favoring assessments had modest directional re-
sults on participants’ decision-making. Second, dependent-favoring
assessments had lile notable eect. ird, the most statistically sig-
nicant eect was that of the life expectancy favoring-assessment
from “expert psychologists,” not that of any AAI assessment.
at life expectancy-favoring assessments had some directional
eect across all three studies, despite being articial, suggests that
AI assessments might be able to inuence decision-making more
with modications to the life expectancy-favoring interventions.
More accurate, genuine AI assessments might have a stronger eect,
and a potential future direction would be to compare the eect of
AAI assessments with those from a proper AI/ML model. However,
it is also likely that the impact of assessments, whether from AI or
AAI, could be intensied through other means as well, given that we
were able to amplify the eects of the intervention between Study 1
and Studies 2 and 3 by changing the the order in which it appeared
and the wording of the assessment. Methods of strengthening
eects of assessments on behavior should be considered both in
developing eective AI interventions and in exercising caution
against the inuence of inaccurate feedback.
It is possible that participants were less receptive to the dependent-
favoring assessment than the life expectancy-favoring assessment
because it was a less complex variable and therefore easier to form
an opinion about: each patient could have only up to four depen-
dents, whereas they could have up to twenty years’ life expectancy.
Comparisons of dierent patient features could yield dierent re-
sults.
e stronger inuence of assessment from “expert psychologists”
compared to the AAI assessment in the life expectancy-favoring
condition could be interpreted in several ways. As evidence-supported
feedback is more eective in belief revision than unsupported feed-
back [13], participants might have believed that evaluation about
decision-making by a psychologist was beer evidence of their
preferences than an evaluation by AI. Alternatively, participants
might have assigned more credibility to “expert psychologists” than
to “AI” simply because of the word “expert.”
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